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INTRODUCTION

The wave of corporate governance reforms that has permeated all of
the systems of Latin America has not significantly impacted the
legislation applicable to closely held companies. This appears to be a
misdirected approach since the region's economic reality is characterized
by family control and concentrated ownership. Surprisingly, most legal
reforms in this field have targeted agency problems more commonly
arising in the context of dispersed equity ownership models. Corporate
governance reforms such as mandatory independent directors, auditing
committees, and certification of financial statements have become
commonplace in securities regulations across the region.
Albeit
important in improving the legal framework of listed companies, most of
these legal reforms disregard the basic underlying agency problem
between controlling shareholders and their minority counterparts.
Regulatory provisions for non-listed firms impose severe restrictions on
private ordering and prevent parties from contracting around
cumbersome imperative norms. In fact, provisions concerning all aspects
of corporate governance, minority shareholders' rights, structural
changes, mergers, dissolution, and liquidation are overwhelming. 2 These
suboptimal anachronistic approaches are justified on the grounds of
public policy and defended at any cost by local legal operators.
Company law in most Latin American jurisdictions continues to
follow the taxonomy of business associations inherited from the
nineteenth century's French codification movement. The point of
1. See Colombian Law 964 of 2005 on Securities Regulation; Argentina, Decree
677 of 2001; Brazil, Law No. 10.303 of 2001; Chile, and Law 18.046 of 1981.
2. See Section 224 of Law 6404 of the Brazilian Corporation Law of 1976 and
Section 1.036 of the Brazilian Civil Code (Law 10.406 of January 10 of 2002); Sections
223 and 240 of the Mexican General Law of Commercial Companies (Law of August 4 '
of 1934) (LGSM); Sections 83, 110 of Law 19.550 of 1972 of Argentina; and Sections
158 and 173 of the Commercial Code of Colombia (Decree 410 of 1971), which provide,
for example, the following:
Partners' board meetings or assembly shall approve with the quorum
provided by the by-laws for mergers, or otherwise an early dissolution, the
respective undertaking which should cover: 1. The reason for the proposed
merger and the manner in which it will take place; 2. Data and figures, taken
from the accounting books of the parties involved, which would have served
as the basis to determine the conditions of the merger; 3. Breakdown and
evaluation of the assets and liabilities of the companies to be absorbed and
those of the absorbing concern; 4. An annex explaining the methods for the
appraisal and exchange of interests, quotas or shares the transaction will
involve; 5. Certified copies of the general financial statements of the
contracting parties.
(Colombian Commercial Code of 1971).
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departure for these systems can be found in the Code Civil and Code de
Commerce of 1804 and 1807, in which the basic types of companies
were included. With the exception of the closely held company
(sociedadde responsabilidadlimitada), the basic business forms already
existed in those codes. Accordingly, most countries in the region have
(1) Stock
regulated four basic types of business associations:
corporations (sociedades an6nimas); (2) Partnerships (sociedades
colectivas); (3) Limited partnerships (sociedades en comandita); and
(4) Closely held companies (sociedades de responsabilidadlimitada).4
Such business forms generally lack the necessary flexibility to cope with
new economic realities due to obsolescence and rigidity. New hybrid
business forms, such as the US LLC and LLP appear to be an appealing
solution to deal with closely held firms in the region. However, attempts
to undertake legal reform in this field must follow a structural transplant
approach; namely, it cannot be restricted to the simple adoption of
substantive law provisions.
This article is intended to provide an analytical framework for the
adoption of a hybrid business form as a model law for closely held firms
in Latin America. It is suggested that the advantages of flexibility and
freedom of contract make such business forms especially suitable for
family-owned firms, start-ups, professional undertakings, and all sorts of
small and medium firms within this region.
The introduction, in December 2008, of the Sociedadpor Acciones
Simplificada or SAS (Colombian Simplified Stock Corporation) is an
example of a successful, efficiency-minded lawmaking effort in a Civil
The SAS is aimed at providing its users with
Law jurisdiction.
flexibility in its organization and capitalization, complete freedom of
contract, and full-fledged limited liability.6 The Colombian example
proves that even in the absence of competition for corporate charters, it is
possible to undertake structural transplants of company law with
extraordinary results. The enthusiasm with which entrepreneurs have
greeted the new legal development is reflected in the high number of
3. The "SRL" was introduced in Brazil after the Portuguese "sociedade por quotas"
of 1905. The same type of business entity was brought to other Latin American countries
after the enactment of the Spanish statute of 1927.
4. For a detailed analysis of the main traits of Latin American business forms, see
Jos6 W. Fernandez et al., Corporate Caveat Emptor: Minority Shareholder Rights in
Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Venezuela and Argentina, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 157
(2001).
5. See Portafolio Economic Journal, Ventajas de las SAS seducen a empresarios;
82% de las empresas creadas en septiembrefue bajo esta modalidad, Bogota, Feb. 10,
2010, available at http://www.portafolio.com.co/archivo/documento/DR-4389 (showing
that during the last several months, most business people preferred the simplified stock
corporation to set up their new companies in Colombia).
6. See Colombian Law 1258 of 2008, Article 1.
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SAS formations that occurred after its inception. Within the first twentyfour months after the statute was passed, more than 54,000 simplified
stock corporations were created, outnumbering every other form of
business association.7
II.

PROPOSALS FOR LATIN AMERICAN COMPANY LAW REFORM

A.

Publicly Held Corporations

As a general rule, economic growth can be assessed through the
measurement of capital market development and the creation of new
businesses. However, Robert Cooter has written that a vigorous stock
market is not necessarily an essential factor for the economic
Using specific examples from
development of poor countries.'
economies in transition such as India and China, the author points to the
significant growth attained in those countries within the last decade. In
determining the manner in which financing has taken place in these
jurisdictions, he has noted the relative absence of highly operational
systems for publicly traded stocks.9
A brief review of statistical data regarding stock exchanges in Latin
America reveals how the stock markets are comparatively depressed as
compared with those existing in developed economies (see Table 1). The
amount of IPOs and other public offerings is limited, the market
capitalization of listed companies is relatively small as a percentage of
gross domestic product ("GDP") (see Table 2), and the number of issuers
of securities is small.
Under the international benchmark method, a comparison is made
between GDPs for the six largest economies in Latin America and
market capitalization in each of their national stock exchanges.

7. See Report on SAS, National Confederation of Chambers of Commerce,
CONFECAMARAS, (November 15, 2010) (on file with author).
8. Robert D. Cooter and Hans Bernd Schaefer, Solomon's Knot, How Law can End
the Poverty of Nations, Draft, February 2009, at 262.
9. Id.
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ration Per Million Inhabitants

1.
2.
3.
4.

Chile
Per6i
Argentina
Colombia

246
221
106
94

16.134.219
28.302.603
40.927.301
44.593.035

15,24709687
8,691780046
6,010657776
5,516556565

5.

Mdxico

335

107.449.525

2,289447068

6.

Brazil

350

190.078.227

1,294203991

Table 2: Percentage of GDP Made Up by Market Capitalization

Positio

iC1

Nu0ber
oflisted
comlpanlies

USS
0
GD i3try
(2006)

Market Cap in
US (2006)

%of
GD P
made uIP
by
miarket
cap

3.
4.
5.

Peri
Mdxico
Colombia

92.416.000.000
839.182.000.000

40.000.000.000
348.000.000.000

43%
41%

6.

1Argentina

221
335
94
106

153.405.000.000
1214.241.000.000

56.000.000.000
51.000.000.000

37%
124%

There appears to be an unfortunate coincidence between the wave of
corporate-governance reform and the significant decrease in the number
of listed firms in all major Latin American jurisdictions (see Table 3,
showing the number of firms listed in Latin American domestic stock
exchanges). Aside from other macroeconomic factors, a hypothesis can
be ventured regarding the increasing costs of compliance (mostly due to
multiple requirements of a formalistic nature) without a consistent
impact on investor confidence. Therefore, the cost of capital may not
have been reduced for publicly held firms.
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Table 3: Number of Firms Listed in Latin American Domestic Stock
Exchanges
600500

300200100

Argentina

Brazil

Chile
I 1990

Colombia

I3 1995

E 2000

Mexico

Peru

Venezuela

l2007

Source: Augusto de la Torre, Latin American CapitalMarkets, The

World Bank, 2007
These data suggest that a listing may not entail a significant
reduction in the cost of capital or, worse yet, other factors such as tax
evasion (which would have to be reduced after listing due to higher
disclosure requirements) represent a negative incentive to list a
corporation in a Latin American stock market. Furthermore, the analysis
of these and other variables may suggest the reasonableness of shifting
the corporate-law agenda towards the improvement of the legal
framework for closely held corporations instead of devoting additional
resources to the development of a publicly held corporation, the future of
which is at best uncertain.
B.

Closely Held Corporations

As a general rule, there is no significant innovation regarding
closely held corporation statutes in the Latin American region.
Outmoded notions such as the lack of single-member companies, a strict
ultra vires doctrine, a fixed term of duration, the existence of several
formalistic prohibitions supposedly aimed at the protection of
shareholders, and a plethora of regulatory provisions better suited for
publicly held entities than for small and medium family businesses, are
only a few of the features characterizing an anachronistic regime that
needs to be reformed.
Probably, the Colombian system in which corporate-law reform has
been underway for the last fifteen years, could be a good example of a
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shifting from the rigidities of an ancien regimelo such as the one
described above to a reform agenda prioritizing flexibility, contractual
freedom and limited liability. The goals advanced in the recent 2008 act
introducing the simplified stock corporation (sociedad por acciones
simplificada) match the contemporary policy agenda which gives
prevalence to the so-called hybrid business forms, also known as
uncorporations." The adaptability of hybrid business forms which can
be used as all-purpose vehicles has led to their introduction in Common
Law and Civil Law jurisdictions around the world.12
III. THE MODEL ACT ON SIMPLIFIED STOCK CORPORATIONS FOR LATIN
AMERICA

The case for developing new business forms is a strong one in Latin
America. Family-owned businesses and closely held companies abound
in the region, creating significant demand for entities that allow parties to
engage in extensive private ordering. Existing business forms have
proven to be inflexible to suit the needs of family-owned and multiowner firms. However, most Latin American legislators-much like
some of their European counterparts-have been reluctant to develop
new hybrid vehicles. Increasing entrepreneurial demand for reform has
only recently spurred several initiatives within the region. Such statutory
enhancements are currently being outmatched by the introduction of a
new business form: the Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada (SAS) or
Simplified Stock Corporation.13 Even though it draws upon the French
Socidtd par Actions Simplifide, this entity closely resembles the hybrid
business entities that have been set in place in the United States and the
United Kingdom during the last several years. By providing a mixture of
corporate and partnership-like components, the SAS allows for
significant contractual flexibility, while still preserving the benefits of
limited liability and asset partitioning.

10. Since the enactment of Law 222 of 1995 (Official Gazette N. 42.156 of
December 20h of 1995), concepts such as the single member enterprise were introduced
in that countries' legislation. Additional statutes such as Laws 1014 of 2006 (Official
Gazette N.46.164 of January 27h of 2006), 1258 of 2008 (Official Gazette N.47.194 of
December 5th of 2008) and 1429 of 2010 (Official Gazette N.47.937 of December 29th of
2010) have continued the flexibilization process.
11. See draft legislation for the Colombian SAS, prepared by the author in 2006 and
that gave rise to the Colombian law on simplified stock corporations, see Official Gazette
N.1 11, BogotA, April 11, 2007, at 1-6.
12. See Joseph A. McCahery and Erik Vermeulen, Corporate Governance and
Innovation: Venture Capital, Joint Venture and Family Businesses, 1, 54 (European
Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 65, 2006), http://papers.ssma.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=894785.
13. See Colombian Law 1258 of 2008.

530

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:3

The basic framework for the SAS's Model Act is based upon the
following five pillars: (i) Full-fledged limited liability; (ii) Simple
incorporation requirements; (iii) Contractual flexibility; (iv) Supple
organizational structure; and (v) Fiscal transparency. 14
The Model Act on Simplified Stock Corporations for Latin
America-crafted after the Colombian example-is not intended to serve
as a partial amendment to be introduced to traditional business forms
regulated in national codes and statutes.15 Instead, it is recommended
that its enactment take place on a separate legislation that could be linked
to the existing system.16 In this manner, the SAS should have to compete
with other types of business forms.
A.

Flexibility to Regulate ShareholderRelationships

Under the simplified stock corporation model, shareholders acquire
broad flexibility to freely regulate their relationships pursuant to a set of
enabling provisions containing off-the-rack housekeeping rules that
7
parties can opt out of and replace for tailor-made provisions, if needed.'
Therefore, shareholder protection can be achieved through devices of a
contractual nature. In this manner, the antagonism between majority and
minority shareholders may be ameliorated through ex ante negotiations.
Agency costs can also be reduced as shareholders are able to satisfy their
contracting interests, by setting up specific provisions on the corporate
documents. For this purpose, the model act not only proposes enabling
provisions but also enhances the enforceability of shareholders'
agreements. Through the latter device, it is possible to reach certain
equilibrium between stockholders by means of sophisticated mechanisms
in which rights and obligations can be crafted to carefully determine a
priori expectations of all corporate participants. Therefore, clauses
setting up drag along or tag along rights, put and call options and buy-out
agreements can be included in shareholders agreements. Following the
14. See MODEL ACT ON THE SIMPLIFIED STOCK CORPORATION, et seq., infra Annex.
15. Such as Commercial Codes and Corporate Law statutes existing in different
countries in this region.
16. See Joseph A. McCahery and Eric P.M. Vermeulen, McCahery, Joseph A.,
Vermeulen, Erik P. M., Hisatake, Masato and Saito, Jun, The New Company Law-What
Matters in an Innovative Economy? (September 2006). ECGI-Law Working Paper No.
75/2006 at 20.
17. See e.g., MODEL ACT ON THE SIMPLIFIED STOCK CORPORATION, § 17, infra Annex
(stating that "Shareholders may freely organize the structure and operation of a simplified
stock corporation in the by-laws. In the absence of specific provisions to this effect, the
shareholders' assembly or the sole shareholder, as the case may be, will be entitled to
exercise all powers legally granted to the shareholders' assemblies of stock corporations,
whilst the management and representation of the simplified stock corporation shall be
granted to the legal representative").
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incomplete contracts theory, this enhanced freedom of contract
complemented by gap-filling through an efficient adjudication process is
intended to provide an improved conflict-resolution scenario for
shareholders. 18
B.

Introduction of Specific Performance

In accordance with the theory of structural transplants,9 the
remedy of specific performance is introduced to allow for the adequate
enforcement of these agreements in the event of default. Furthermore,
the Model Act incorporates a comprehensive regulation on the abus de
droit (abuse of rights) theory, which is extrapolated from the French
jurisprudence on Corporate Law.20
Under this theory, shareholders have the ability to bring judicial
actions or arbitration complaints, not only on the grounds of abuses of
controlling shareholders, but also concerning the same conduct where it
has been deployed by minority shareholders, and also in the event of an
abuse in symmetrical block shareholdings (i.e., dual ownership on a
50%-50% distribution). 2 1 The abuse-of-right action may give rise to
damages for the aggrieved party, as well as rescission of the abusive act.
Fiduciary duties of care and loyalty can also be applicable to the officers
and directors of the SAS. To complete the scenario of corporate-law
protections, the Model Act allows for the application of the shadow
director doctrine, by means of which any person who intrudes in a
positive management activity, without being a legally appointed manager
or director, can be disciplined under fiduciary duties as if she were acting
in such managerial capacity.22
18. See William Bratton et al., ComparativeCorporate Governance and the Theory
of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross-Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
213, 273-74 (1999).
19. Such a concept implies that it is not sufficient for the importation of a rule to
merely incorporate into the borrowing country the substantive principles or provisions
that work properly in the foreign lending jurisdiction. Along with such substantive norms
it is also necessary to incorporate the rules (procedural or otherwise) and factors that
cause such provisions to operate properly, including all circumstances that determine its
efficiency and enforceability. See Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, FiduciaryDuty in
Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions: Lessons from the Incomplete Law Theory, in
GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A
NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 77 (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003).

20. ALEXIS CONSTANTIN, Droit des Socidtis, Droit comdin et droit special des
socidtis, 2' edici6n, Paris, Dalloz, 2005, at 85.
2 1. Id.
22.

See MODEL ACT ON THE SIMPLIFIED STOCK CORPORATION,

§ 27,

1, infra Annex

("Any individual or legal entity who is not a manager or director of a simplified stock
corporation that engages in any trade or activity related to the management, direction or
operation of such corporation shall be subject to the same liabilities applicable to
directors and officers of the corporation.")
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C.

Piercingthe CorporateVeil to Extend Liability to Controlling
Shareholder

Even if limited liability is one of the main features of the SAS, the
Model Act provides for piercing the corporate veil in order to extend
liability to controlling shareholders in the event of fraud or abuse.23 Such
a procedure has to be brought before a specialized jurisdiction or an
arbitration panel that will guarantee a more technical and expedited
resolution for aggrieved creditors, as compared to the ordinary systems
of adjudication which are handled before civil courts. 24
The SAS is as useful for local businessmen as it is for foreign
investors. The Model Act seeks to remedy the legislative void existing
throughout the region concerning hybrid business forms, as well as
reducing transaction costs and providing entrepreneurs with enough
flexibility to allow for private ordering in a multi-functional business
form, suitable for all kinds of undertakings.2 5
IV. SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE SAS MODEL ACT

The enabling nature of most of the SAS provisions is particularly
relevant, due to the parties' ability to freely draft any clauses that may
allow them to neutralize the sort of agency problems that usually
characterize non-listed firms.26 By exercising this significant contractual
freedom, shareholders can stay away from standardized corporate
contracts. In this manner, creativity and innovation concerning new
corporate structures may be fostered.
Nature and Legal Personality

A.

In the first place, the SAS is a business entity that may be created
either by the execution of a contract or through the subscription of an

23. See MODEL ACT ON THE SIMPLIFIED STOCK CORPORATION, § 41, infra Annex
("The corporate veil may be pierced whenever the simplified stock corporation is used
for the purpose of committing fraud. Accordingly, joint and several liability may be
imposed upon shareholders, directors and managers in case of fraud or any other
wrongful act perpetrated in the name of the corporation.").
24. See Colombian Law 1258 of 2008, article 40, regarding arbitration and
specialized procedures for the Simplified Stock Corporation of Colombia.
25.

For example, MODEL ACT ON THE SIMPLIFIED STOCK CORPORATION,

§

5, 5

[hereinafter MODEL ACT] allows for incorporators to state in the entity's by laws that
corporation may engage in any lawful business, unless a restricted purpose has been set
forth by the parties.
26. See, for example, MODEL ACT, supra note 25, §§ 6, 7, according to which, the
parties enjoy considerable leeway to stipulate any provisions for the management of the
business and for the conduct of its affairs, provided that at least one legal representative is
appointed to conduct the affairs of the corporation in relation with third parties.
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incorporation document by the sole shareholder.2 7 This feature is
intended to provide investors with a high level of flexibility. The
business entity is suitable either for the formation of small, single
member corporations or large, multi-owner enterprises including entities
forming part of corporate groups. The SAS can be used in any venture,
irrespective of the number of shareholders that concur to incorporate it or
who subscribe shares at a subsequent stage.2 8 In fact, neither the
entrance nor the exit of stockholders can affect the continuity of the
corporate entity, as long as one person remains as a shareholder. In this
way, the antiquated rules setting forth minimum and maximum numbers
of shareholders are surpassed completely.
The legal personification of the SAS is produced once the document
of incorporation (private or public deed) is filed before the Mercantile
Registry. Registration of the simplified corporation has a "constitutive"
nature, since it determines the regularity of the business association, the
benefits arising from asset partitioning, and limited liability. The SAS is
designed to be registered online. Therefore, notarizations and other
annoying formalities are altogether surpassed in the SAS scheme.
It is necessary to emphasize that the SAS is not conceived to be
listed in a stock market. The SAS is a business association type designed
to structure closely held companies. The broad contractual flexibility
that allows providing for rules concerning the squeeze out of
shareholders, stocks with multiple voting rights, severe restrictions on
stock transfers, among others, may be incompatible with the investor
protection guidelines that are mandated for listed companies. For the
same reasons, the French SAS statute does not allow the possibility of
raising resources originating from private savings in the stock market
(appellationptiblique 6 l 'pargne).29
Incorporationand ProofofExistence

B.

The Model Act indicates how the SAS may arise out of a contract or
a unilateral act. 30 This approach is intended to surpersede the oldfashioned discussion, so frequent in Latin America and even in
Continental European countries, concerning the so-called one-person
corporation. This significant improvement is immensely useful for
structuring corporate groups where total corporate control may be
centralized in a single parent corporation.

See MODEL ACT, supra note 5, § 5; see also id., infra Annex.
28. Id.
29. See DOMINIQUE VIDAL, DROIT DES SocIETEs 585 (Paris, L.G.D.J. 2006).
30. See MODEL ACT, supra note 25, §§ 5 & 6; see also id, infra Annex.

27.
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Among other things, the Model Act intends to reduce administrative
and bureaucratic procedures and formalities necessary for the
incorporation of a company. The corresponding provisions are aimed at
reducing entry barriers in order to facilitate the creation of new
businesses and mitigate the impact of transaction costs.31 Accordingly,
the required procedure to set up a SAS has been reduced to the filing of
the formation document in the country's mercantile registry. Section 5
of the Model Act states that a simplified stock corporation "will be
formed by contract or by the individual will of a single shareholder,
provided that a written document is granted." 32 Pursuant to the same
provision, the formation document "shall be registered before the
Mercantile Registry." 3 3
The SAS Model Act authorizes the parties to set up an unrestricted
corporate purpose. (I would say "any lawful purpose.") 34 This approach
is found to be more convenient due to efficiency considerations. Such a
characteristic determines a meaningful difference in the economic
conception of the stock corporation. Within the unrestricted purpose
clause system, managers obtain a higher degree of discretionary authority
to run the corporation. There is no need to amend the corporation's bylaws every time that a new, different business opportunity arises.
It is true that broadening the scope of business activities that the
corporation can carry on ameliorates the impact of the ultra vires theory
which has permeated most Latin American jurisdictions. Indeed, the
traditional "specialty theory," by means of which the partners have to
define ex restricted objects in the foundational documents, has also led to
complicated and protracted litigation. The corollary of such specialty
theory is closely linked with "ultra vires" concerns, for any act beyond
the corporation's objects is deemed to be null and void. This legal
consequence arises from the lack of legal capacity to undertake any
activity beyond the purpose clause. As it is obvious within the SAS,
parties can opt out this default provision and set up a restricted-purpose
clause in the corporate by-laws, defining the specific corporation's main
economic activities that, in turn, will determine the entity's legal
capacity. 35

3 1. Id. (This flows naturally from the previous sentence so whatever the professor is
citing to in the previous citation-it will be the same citation for this one.)
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. See MODEL AcT, supra note 25, § 5(5); see also id., infra Annex.
35. See id. §§ 5 & 6.
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CapitalContributionsand Shares

One of the most relevant aspects of the new statute has to do with
the great flexibility afforded to entrepreneurs that intend to make cash
contributions to the firm. The SAS can be funded through a variety of
channels, which surpass even the financing mechanisms available for
traditional stock corporations. Even if the SAS cannot undertake public
issuances of shares due to its nature as an archetypical closely held
entity, the flexibility of its capital structure facilitates the process of
raising resources from private actors.
Section 10 of the SAS Model Act allows entrepreneurs to freely
allocate numerical values to the firm's authorized, subscribed, and paidin capital.36 Furthermore, it allows for payment of the firm's subscribed
capital to take place up to two years after the shares have been initially
subscribed. Firms can also issue classes of shares with varying rights.
Section 9 allows for capital subscription and payment to be carried out
under "terms and conditions different to those set forth under the
Commercial Code."3 9 Under Section 10 of the SAS Model Act, firms
can also issue "preferred shares with or without vote." This opens up
myriad possibilities for entrepreneurs, who have traditionally been
unable to freely determine the rights carried by shares that are issued in
closely held firms.40
In granting ample flexibility for firms to issue different classes of
shares, the SAS Model Act not only favors capital-raising processes but
perhaps more importantly, facilitates the administration of corporate
affairs by entrepreneurs.
Company Organization

D.

Simplifying the operation and organic structure is an important goal
of hybrid business forms. Attaining such a goal ameliorates the costs
associated with the company's operation. Accordingly, one of the
principal aspects of the SAS legal regime is the creation of a flexible
regime, which allows entrepreneurs to opt out of otherwise mandatory
provisions. 4 1 The enabling character of this regulation also gives way to
an enormous freedom of organization for the shareholders. Prin holds
that within the regulation of the French Simplified Stock Corporation the
combination of freedom of contract with the elements of stock
See MODEL ACT ON THE SIMPLIFIED STOCK CORPORATION, § 9, infra Annex.

36.
37.

Id.

38.
39.
40.
41.

See id § 10.
See id
See id. at§ 11.
See MODEL ACT, supra note 25, § 5, see also id, infra Annex.
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corporations constitutes an unprecedented privilege in that country's
42
For any economic agent, the election of the SAS as a
legal system.
business structure corresponds to the desire of increasing the
organization's efficiency by making it suitable to shareholders'
necessities.43
The SAS Model Act confers entrepreneurs with complete freedom
over the company's internal organization structure. This is meant to
lighten the firm's bureaucratic burden by reducing to a minimum its
mandatory organs. Section 17 of the Model Act establishes in a very
clear fashion that the SAS's structure may be freely defined in its bylaws, to wit: "Shareholders may freely organize the structure and
operation of a simplified stock corporation in the by-laws."4 In the
absence of specific by-law provisions, "the shareholders' assembly or the
sole shareholder, as the case may be, will be entitled to exercise all
powers legally granted to the shareholders' assemblies of stock
corporations, whilst the management and representation of the simplified
stock corporation shall be granted to the legal representativeA5
In this manner, the SAS's shareholders' assembly maintains a
preponderant role that is reflected in the great variety of powers
attributed to it. Therefore, most significant corporate transactions must
be authorized by the shareholders duly gathered in the assembly or by the
sole shareholder. Specifically, the Model Act, in its Section 37, confers
upon the assembly the power to consider and approve the "financial
statements and annual accounts" of the company.46 These documents
must be submitted to the business entity's highest organ by the
corporation's legal representative before the corresponding shareholders'
assembly meeting. The same Section adds that when dealing with
corporations with a single shareholder, she will approve all the
company's accounts and will leave a record of such approval in the
company minutes dutifully filed in the corporate books.4 7
The by-laws may also create other organs such as the board of
directors to carry on part of the activities usually performed by the
assembly.
As the corporation's main governing body, the assembly draws the
firm's policies, adopts structural decisions (conversions, mergers, splitup, winding up, etc.), approves financial statements, distributes profits
42. Pierre-Louis Pdrin, La Socidtd par Actions Simplfide: Etudes-Formules 11 (Joly
Editions 3d ed. 2008).
43. Id.
44. See MODEL ACT, supra note 25, § 18, see also id, infra Annex.
45. See id.§ 17.
46. See id.§ 37.
47. Id.
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and creates reserves. 4 8 As it is the general approach in the Model Act,
the cited part of Section 14 is in part a default rule, subject to the parties'
will. Therefore, it is viable to allocate some of the corporate powers
assigned to the assembly in a different fashion.
E.

Meetings of the Shareholders'Assembly

The rules for the operation of the shareholders' assembly also
contain meaningful modifications to traditional approaches, as once
again the Model Act aspires to decrease unnecessary formalism. To this
effect, the proposed changes simplify the existing rules for calling
meetings of shareholders, as well as the provisions that govern quorum,
majorities, actions without a meeting, etc. This is a very significant
change since it removes a series of requirements based on old-fashioned
standards, which traditionally paved the way for innumerable lawsuits
originating in these purely formalistic aspects.
In order to facilitate the decision-making processes in the SAS, and
bearing in mind that it is a useful instrument for foreign investment, the
Model Act allows shareholders' assemblies to meet at any specific
location, irrespective of its main domicile. 49 Another manner in which
the Model Act seeks to facilitate the operation of shareholders' meetings
is through the creation of alternative mechanisms for the adoption of
decisions and the simplification of existing mechanisms for this same
purpose.so In any event, due to the fact that these rules are enabling
rather than mandatory, it will always be possible to stipulate different
requirements for actions without a meeting to be effectuated.
Regarding notice of meetings, the parties can set up alternative
mechanisms and define, within reasonable limits, the term between the
delivery of such notice and the date when the meeting will be held.
Section 19 of the cited Act allows for meetings "through any available
technological devices or by written consent." 5 2 A provision like this
clearly foresees the applicability of any available technological means of
communication. The utilization of these devices will only increase
through time, as local economies and jurisdictions become more

48.
49.
50.
51.

See MODEL ACT, supra note 25, § 20, see also id, infra Annex.
See id. § 18.
See id § 19.
See CLAUDE PENHOAT, DROIT DES SOCIETES 303 (AENGDE 5th ed. 1998).

Claude Penhoat suggests diverse forms of deliberations within the French SAS structure,

including vote cast directly by shareholders who attend the meeting, vote by
correspondence, vote by proxy, and any other technique. The same author adds that
quorum and majority conditions are freely defined in the by-laws, except for some
decisions requiring unanimity. Id.
52. See MODEL ACT, supra note 25, § 19, see also id., infra Annex.
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integrated and intertwined. The SAS Model Act also allows for the
shareholders to define in the by-laws the corporate organ that will be
entitled to formulate the respective notice.5 3
The mechanism regarding the waiver of notice to shareholders'
meetings constitutes a great innovation in the simplified stock
corporation. Under the general regime, omitting the notice of meeting or
formulating it inadequately has the potential to disrupt the firm's internal
affairs. In practice, the shareholders of a closely held corporation (which
are often member of the same family) will not observe the full
formalities required for calling meeting of the shareholders' assembly.
However, this will not have any adverse effects for the shareholders, as
they will in practice have full knowledge of the dealings undertaken in
the assembly. Accordingly, it is reasonable to allow them to validate the
formerly incurable breach of the formalities for calling meetings of
So, if for
shareholders, through the waiver-of-notice mechanism.
example, after an assembly meeting in which there was a sufficient
quorum (though not a universal one) and decisions were taken with the
proper majorities, it was established that the absentee shareholders were
not dutifully called, this breach in the formalities for calling the meeting
can be cured though a simple letter addressed to the corporation's legal
representative. For this effect, the only requirement needed is the
submission of a written document to the company before, during, or after
the corresponding session.
In the same path of creating a more effective and balanced regime
for the SAS than the one that exists for other business forms, the Model
Act proposes the creation of an implicit validation system for assembly
decisions in cases where the notice of meeting given to all or some of the
shareholders present at the assembly has been irregular or nonexistent. 54
In fact, even if they were not summoned to the assembly, the law
presumes that those shareholders attending the corresponding meeting
have waived their right of notice. Nevertheless, Section 21 of the SAS
Model Act allows present shareholders to demand an appropriate
advance notice before the meeting takes place.ss The provision states
that "the attendees in a given shareholders' assembly will be deemed to
have waived the right of being convened, unless such shareholders make
a statement to the contrary before the meeting takes place."
In summary, the rigidity of the current regulations in Latin
American jurisdictions is attenuated in this subject matter by the

53.
54.
55.
5 6.

See id. § 20.
See id.§ 21.
Id.
Id.
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introduction of innovative legal rules facilitating shareholders' effective
communication and, furthermore, by allowing entrepreneurs to dispense
with unnecessary nullifications and other legal sanctions when no
damage exists because of such omission.
V.

EMPIRICAL DEMONSTRATION CONCERNING THE COLOMBIAN SAS

The enactment of Colombian Law 1258 of 2008 (Official Gazette
N.47.194 of December 5 th of 2008), by means of which the Simplified
Stock Corporations (SAS by its acronym in Spanish) was created, has
been by far the most successful company-law reform in the last several
The implementation of the SAS has given rise to a certain
decades.
degree of competition among the different types of business associations
that exist in the country's commercial legislation. The inception of the
new business form allows entrepreneurs to choose between a traditional
legal regime characterized by old-fashioned, backward regulations and
the new modem corporate type of entity. Certainly, the new business
vehicle, which is useful for all purposes, has represented, since the law
was enacted, a gradual wither away from the Colombian businessassociation types existing prior to Law 1258 of 2008. The comparative
inferiority of traditional business association types formerly used to
structure closely held companies makes their future use unnecessary,
given the undeniable practical advantages offered by the SAS. This
assertion is evident in light of the exponential growth of the simplified
stock corporation in Colombia. 8
The reaction of the business community to the new regulation on
Simplified Stock Corporations has surpassed all expectations.59 As the
graph below shows, the SAS has acquired a level of significant
importance within local business associations. The data not only show
the impressive acceptance of the SAS during this period, but also the
progress made by this company type vis-ai-vis the previously existing
ones. As a result, while in December 2008 the percentage of SAS only
reached 7.42% of the total number of business associations registrations,
by August 2010, this company type represented 81.3% of all registered
companies. This trend has been consistent during 2010. As Table 4
57. Certainly, previous reforms such as the one introduced by Law 222 of 1995 had
a more restricted impact than the SAS. This law constituted only a "patch up" reform to
traditional corporate rules contained in the Colombian Commercial Code. Such approach
limited the scope of legislative changes that otherwise could have been made under a
more progressive orientation.
58. See Portafolio Economic Journal, Editorial,Bogota, Feb. 3, 2011, available at
http://www.portafolio.co/archivo/buscarproducto-portafolio&q-febrero+3+de+20 11.
59. Data for this section (consolidated for the entire country) has been obtained
directly from the Confederation of Colombian Chambers of Commerce,
CONFECAMARAS.
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reflects the percentage of SAS during the first eight months of this year,
the percentage of simplified stock corporations has ranged between 70%
and 82% of the total amount of new registrations.
Before the enactment of the SAS statute, entrepreneurs were bound
to use the traditional types of business associations regulated under the
Commercial Code. These business forms were the general partnership,
the limited liability company, the limited partnership, and the stock
corporation. The statistics show the downfall of these traditional
entities, as well as the rise of the SAS. In particular, it is observed that
since April 2009, the Simplified Stock Corporation became the favorite
company type in Colombia, surpassing even the limited liability
company. The latter was, since its inception in 1937 and until that
moment, the most widely used company type in Colombia.
Table 4: Evolution of the SAS Compared to Other Company Types
(2008-2010)
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VI. CONCLUSION
Understanding the underlying economic model in Latin American
countries allows for the determination of the most frequent agency
problems present in business corporations in the region. Taking into
account the high degree of concentrated ownership that prevails across
Latin American countries, solutions should be devised in order to
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counteract the potentiality for oppression of minority shareholders at the
hands of block-holders.
The theory of structural transplants is useful for the introduction of
a system that is based upon two pillars. The first pillar is composed of
enabling statutes that allow parties to opt out of default legal provisions.
Private ordering facilitates the creation of tailor-made rules appropriate
for closely held entities. Such freedom of contract contributes to
achieving a higher degree of completeness in the corporate contract. The
second pillar concerns procedural provisions that are intended to increase
the degree of enforcement intensity so that gap-filling by arbitrators,
judicial authorities and other entities is facilitated.
The Model Act on Simplified Stock Corporations for Latin America
is an attempt to incorporate modern trends into legal systems
characterized by a formalistic and backward structure in which
regulatory provisions prevail to an overwhelming extent. The extremely
successful, empirically measured result of Colombian Law 1258 of 2008
(with more than 54,000 Simplified Stock Corporations created in a short
term) clearly suggests that businesspeople prefer flexibility to oldfashioned, misguided paternalism. The widespread adoption of the
Model Act would not only allow for a certain degree of convergence in
countries that require a higher level of legal integration, but also could
foster innovation and foreign investment.
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Annex
Model Act on the Simplified Stock Corporation (MASSC)
Chapter I
General Provisions
Section 1. Nature.-The simplified stock corporation is a for profit
legal entity by shares, the nature of which will always be commercial
irrespective of the activities set forth in its purpose clause.
Section 2. Limited Liability.-The simplified stock corporation
may be formed by one or more persons or legal entities.
Shareholders will only be responsible for providing the capital
contributions promised to the simplified stock corporation.
Except as set forth in Section 41 of this Act, shareholders will not
be held liable for any obligations incurred by the simplified stock
corporation, including, but not limited to, labor and tax obligations.
There shall be no labor relationship between a simplified stock
corporation and its shareholders, unless an explicit agreement has been
executed to that effect.
Section 3. Legal Personality.-Upon the filing of the formation
document before the Mercantile Registry [include the name of
corresponding company registrar's office], the simplified stock
corporation will form a legal entity separate and distinct from its
shareholders.
Section 4. Inability to Become a Listed Entity.-The shares of
stock and other securities issued by a simplified stock corporation shall
be registered within a stock exchange, nor traded in any securities
market.
Chapter II
Formation and Proof of Existence
Section 5. Contents of the Formation Document.-A simplified
stock corporation will be formed by contract or by the individual will of
a single shareholder, provided that a written document is granted. The
formation document shall be registered before the Mercantile Registry
[include the name of corresponding company registrar's office], and
shall set forth:
(1) The name and address of each shareholder;
(2) The name of the corporation followed by the words "simplified
stock corporation" or the abbreviation "S.A.S.";
(3) The corporation's domicile;
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(4) If the simplified stock corporation is to have a specific date of
dissolution, the date in which the corporation is to dissolve;
(5) A clear and complete description of the main business activities
to be included within the purpose clause, unless it is stated that
the corporation may engage in any lawful business;
(6) The authorized, subscribed and paid-in capital, along with the
number of shares to be issued, the different classes of shares,
their par value, and the terms and conditions in which the
payment will be made;
(7) Any provisions for the management of the business and for the
conduct of the affairs of the corporation, along with the names
and powers of each manager. A simplified stock corporation
shall have at least one legal representative in charge of
managing the affairs of the corporation in relation with third
parties.
No additional formalities of any nature shall be required for the
formation of the simplified stock corporation.
Section 6. Attestation.-The Mercantile Registrar [include the
name of corresponding company registrar's office] shall attest to the
legality of the provisions set forth in the formation document and any
amendments thereof.
The Registrar shall only deny registration where the requirements
provided under Section 5 have not been met. The decision rendered by
the Registrar shall be issued within three days after the relevant filing has
been made. Any decision denying registration will only be subject to a
rehearing conducted by the Registrar.
Upon the approval of a formation document by the Mercantile
Registrar, challenges will not be heard against the existence of the
simplified stock corporation and the contents of the formation document
will constitute the simplified stock corporation's by-laws.
Section 7. Assimilation to Partnership.-Where a formation
document has not been duly approved by the Mercantile Registrar
[include the name of corresponding company registrar's office], the
purported corporation will be assimilated to a partnership. Accordingly,
partners will be jointly and severally liable for all obligations in which
the partnership is engaged. If the partnership has only one member, such
member will be held liable for all obligations in which the partnership is
engaged.
Section 8. Proof of Existence.-The certificate issued by the
Mercantile Registrar [include the name of corresponding company
registrar'soffice] is conclusive evidence as regards the existence of the

544

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:3

simplified stock corporation and the provisions set forth in the formation
document.
Chapter III
Special Rules Regarding Subscribed, Paid-in Capital and
Shares of Stock
Capital Subscription and Payment.-Capital
Section 9.
subscription and payment may be carried out under terms and conditions
different to those set forth under the Commercial Code or corporate
statute [include the name of the relevant Code, Decree, Law or Statute].
In any event, payment of subscribed capital shall be made within a
period of two years to be counted from the date in which the shares were
subscribed. The rules for subscription and payment may be freely set
forth in the by-laws.
Section 10. Classes of Shares.-The simplified stock corporation
may issue different classes or series of shares, including preferred shares
with or without vote. Shares may be issued for any consideration
whatsoever, including in-kind contributions or in exchange for labor,
pursuant to the terms and conditions contained in the by-laws.
Any special rights granted to the holders of any class or series of
shares shall be described or affixed upon the back of the stock
certificates.
Section 11. Voting Rights.-The by-laws shall depict in full detail
the voting rights corresponding to each class of shares. Such document
shall also determine whether each share will grant its holder single or
multiple voting rights.
Section 12. Share Transfers to a Trust.-Any shares issued by a
simplified stock corporation may be transferred to a trust provided that
an annotation is made in the corporate ledger concerning the trustee
company, the beneficial owners and the percentage of beneficial rights.
Section 13. Limitation on the Transferability of Shares.-The
by-laws may contain a provision whereby the shares may not be
transferred for a period not to exceed ten years, to be counted from the
moment in which the shares were issued. Such term can only be
extended by consent of all the holders of outstanding shares.
Any such limitation on share transferability shall be described or
affixed upon the back of the stock certificate.
Section 14. Authorization for the Transfer of Shares.-The bylaws may contain provisions whereby any transfer of shares or of any
given class of shares will be subject to the previous authorization of the
shareholders' assembly, which shall be granted by majority vote or by
any supermajority included in the by-laws.
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Section 15. Breach of Restrictions on Negotiation of Shares.Any transfer of shares carried out in a manner inconsistent with the rules
set forth in the by-laws shall be null and void.
Section 16. Change of Control in a Corporate Shareholder.The by-laws may impose upon an incorporated shareholder the duty to
notify the simplified stock corporation's legal representative about any
transaction that may cause a change in control regarding such
shareholder.
Where a change in control has taken place, the shareholders'
assembly, by majority decision, shall be entitled to exclude the
corresponding incorporated shareholder.
Aside from the possibility of being excluded, any breach of the duty
to inform changes in control may subject the concerned shareholder to a
penalty consisting of a 20% reduction of the fair market value of the
shares, upon reimbursement.
In the event set forth in this article, all decisions concerning the
exclusion of shareholders, as well as the determination of any penalties,
shall require an approval rendered by the shareholders' assembly by
majority vote. The votes of the concerned shareholder shall not be taken
into account for the adoption of these decisions.
Chapter IV
Organization of the Simplified Stock Corporation
Section 17. Organization.-Shareholders may freely organize the
structure and operation of a simplified stock corporation in the by-laws.
In the absence of specific provisions to this effect, the shareholders'
assembly or the sole shareholder, as the case may be, will be entitled to
exercise all powers legally granted to the shareholders' assemblies of
stock corporations, whilst the management and representation of the
simplified stock corporation shall be granted to the legal representative.
Where the number of shareholders has been reduced to one, the
subsisting shareholder shall be entitled to exercise the powers afforded to
all existing corporate organs.
Section 18. Meetings.-Meetings of shareholders may be held at
any place designated by the shareholders, whether it is the corporate
domicile or not. For these meetings, the regular quorum provided in the
by-laws will suffice, pursuant to Section 22 hereof.
Section 19. Meetings by Technological Devices or by Written
Consent.-Meetings of shareholders may be held through any available
technological device, or by written consent. The minutes of such
meetings shall be drafted and included within the corporate records no
later than 30 days after the meeting has taken place. These minutes shall
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be signed by the legal representative or, in her absence, by any
shareholder that participated in the meeting.
Section 20. Notice of Meeting.-In the absence of stipulation to
the contrary, the legal representative shall convene the shareholders'
assembly by written notice addressed to each shareholder. Such notice
shall be made at least five days in advance to the meeting. The agenda
shall in all cases be included within any notice of meeting.
Whenever the shareholders' assembly is called upon to approve
financial statements, the conversion of the corporation into another
business form, or mergers or split-off proceedings, shareholders will be
entitled to exercise information rights concerning any documents
Information rights may be
relevant to the proposed transaction.
exercised during the five days prior to the meeting, unless a longer term
has been provided for in the by-laws.
Any notice of meeting may determine the date in which the Second
Call Meeting will take place, in case the quorum is insufficient to hold
the first meeting. The date for the second meeting may not be held prior
to ten days following the first meeting, nor after thirty days from that
same moment.
Waiver of Notice.-Shareholders may, at any
Section 21.
moment, submit written waivers of notice whereby they forego their
right to be convened to a meeting of the shareholders' assembly.
Shareholders may also waive, in writing, any information rights granted
under Section 20.
In any given shareholders assembly and even in the absence of a
notice of meeting, the attendees will be deemed to have waived their
right of being summoned, unless such shareholders make a statement to
the contrary before the meeting takes place.
Section 22. Quorum and Majorities.-Unless otherwise specified
in the by-laws, quorum to a shareholders' meeting will be constituted by
a majority of shares, whether present in person or represented by proxy.
Decisions of the assembly shall be taken by the affirmative vote of
the majority of shares present (in person or represented by proxy), unless
the by-laws contain supermajority provisions.
The sole shareholder of a simplified stock corporation may adopt
any and all decisions within the powers granted to the shareholders'
assembly. The sole shareholder will keep a record of such decisions in
the corporate books.
Section 23. Vote Splitting.-Shareholders may split their votes
during cumulative voting proceedings for the election of directors or the
members of any other corporate organ.
Section 24. Shareholders' Agreements.-Agreements entered
into between shareholders concerning the acquisition or sale of shares,
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preemptive rights or rights of first refusal, the exercise of voting rights,
voting by proxy, or any other valid matter, shall be binding upon the
simplified stock corporation, provided that such agreements have been
Shareholders'
filed with the corporation's legal representative.
agreements shall be valid for any period of time determined in the
agreement, not exceeding 10 years, upon the terms and conditions stated
therein. Such 10 year term may only be extended by unanimous consent.
Shareholders that have executed an agreement shall appoint a
person who will represent them for the purposes of receiving information
and providing it whenever it is requested. The simplified stock
corporation's legal representative may request, in writing, to such
representative, clarification as regards any provision set forth in the
agreement. The response shall be provided also in writing within the
five days following the request.
Subsection 1.-The President of the shareholders' assembly, or of
the concerned corporate organs, shall exclude any votes cast in a manner
inconsistent with the terms set forth under a duly filed shareholders'
agreement.
Subsection 2.-Pursuant to the conditions set forth in the
agreement, any shareholder shall be entitled to demand, before a court
with jurisdiction over the corporation, the specific performance of any
obligation arising under such agreement.
Section 25. Board of Directors.-The simplified stock corporation
is not required to have a board of directors, unless such board is
mandated in the by-laws. In the absence of a provision requiring the
operation of a board of directors, the legal representative appointed by
the shareholders' assembly shall be entitled to exercise any and all
powers concerning the management and legal representation of the
simplified stock corporation.
If a board of directors has been included in the formation document,
such board will be created with one or more directors, for each of whom
an alternate director may also be appointed. All directors may be
appointed either by majority vote, cumulative voting, or by any other
mechanism set forth in the by-laws. The rules regarding the operation of
the board of directors may be freely established in the by-laws. In the
absence of a specific provision in the by-laws, the board will be
governed under the relevant statutory provisions.
Section 26. Legal Representation.-The legal representation of
the simplified stock corporation will be carried out by an individual or
legal entity appointed in the manner provided in the by-laws. The legal
representative may undertake and execute any and all acts and contracts
included within the purpose clause, as well as those which are directly
related to the operation and existence of the corporation.
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The legal representative shall not be required to remain at the place
where the business has its main domicile.
Liability of Directors and Managers.-All
Section 27.
Commercial Code [include the name of the relevant Code, Decree, Law
or Statute] provisions relating to the liability of directors and managers
may also be applicable to the legal representative, the board of directors,
and the managers and officers of the simplified stock corporation, unless
such provision is opted out of in the by-laws.
Subsection 1.-Any individual or legal entity who is not a manager
or director of a simplified stock corporation that engages in any trade or
activity related to the management, direction or operation of such
corporation shall be subject to the same liabilities applicable to directors
and officers of the corporation.
Subsection 2.-Whenever a simplified stock corporation or any of
its managers or directors grants apparent authority to an individual or

legal entity to the extent that it may be reasonably believed that such
individual or legal entity has sufficient powers to represent the
corporation, the company will be legally bound by any transaction
entered into with third parties acting in good faith.
Section 28. Auditing Organs.-A simplified stock corporation
shall not, in any case, be legally mandated to establish or provide for
internal auditing organs [include the name of corresponding auditing
entity, e.g., fiscal auditor,auditingcommittee, etc.].
Chapter V
By-Law Amendments and Corporate Restructurings
Section 29. By-law Amendments.-Amendments to the corporate
by-laws shall be approved by majority vote. Decisions to this effect will
be recorded in a private document to be filed with the Mercantile
Registry [include the name of correspondingcompany registrar'soffice].
Section 30. Corporate Restructurings.-The statutory provisions
governing conversion into another form, mergers and split-off
proceedings for business associations will be applicable to the simplified
stock corporation. Dissenters' rights and appraisal remedies shall also be
applicable.
For the purpose of exercising dissenters' rights and appraisal
remedies, a corporate restructuring will be considered detrimental to the
economic interests of a shareholder, inter alia, whenever:
(1) The dissenting shareholder's percentage in the subscribed paidin capital of the simplified stock corporation has been reduced;
(2) The corporation's equity value has been diminished, or
(3) The free transferability of shares has been constrained.

2011]

MODERNIZING LATIN AMERICAN COMPANY LAW

549

Section 31. Conversion into Another Business Form.-Any
existing business entity may be converted into a simplified stock
corporation by unanimous decision rendered by the holders of all issued
rights or shares in such business form. The decision to convert into a
simplified stock corporation shall be registered before the Mercantile
Registry [include the name of correspondingcompany registrar'soffice].
A simplified stock corporation may be converted into any other
business form governed under the Commercial Code [include the name
of the relevant Code, Decree, Law or Statute] provided that unanimous
decision is rendered by the holders of all issued and outstanding shares in
the corporation.
Section 32. Substantial Sale of Assets.-Whenever a simplified
stock corporation purports to sell or convey assets and liabilities
amounting to 60% or more of its equity value, such sale or conveyance
will be considered to be a substantial sale of assets.
Substantial sales of assets shall require majority shareholder
approval. Whenever a substantial sale of assets is detrimental to the
interests of one or more shareholders, it shall give rise to the application
of dissenters' rights and appraisal remedies.
Section 33. Short-form Merger.-In any case in which at least
90% of the outstanding shares of a simplified stock corporation is owned
by another legal entity, such entity may absorb the simplified stock
corporation by the sole decision of the boards of directors or legal
representatives of all entities directly involved in the merger.
Short-form mergers may be executed by private document duly
registered before the Mercantile Registry [include the name of
correspondingcompany registrar'soffice].
Chapter VI
Dissolution and Winding Up
Section 34. Dissolution and Winding Up.-The simplified stock
corporation shall be dissolved and wound up whenever:
(1) An expiration date has been included in the formation document
and such term has elapsed, provided that a determination to
extend it has not been approved by the shareholders, before or
after such expiration has taken place;
(2) For legal or other reasons, the corporation is absolutely unable to
carry out the business activities provided under the purpose
clause;
(3) Compulsory liquidation proceedings have been initiated;
(4) An event of dissolution set forth in the by-laws has taken place;
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(5) A majority shareholder decision has been rendered or such
decision has been made by the will of the sole shareholder, and
(6) A decision to that effect has been rendered by any authority with
jurisdiction over the corporation.
Whenever the duration term has elapsed, the corporation shall be
dissolved automatically. In all other cases, the decision to dissolve the
simplified stock corporation shall be filed before the MercantileRegistry
[include the name of correspondingcompany registrar'soffice].
Section 35. Curing Events of Dissolution.-Events of dissolution
may be cured by adopting any and all measures available to that effect,
provided that such measures are adopted within one year, following the
date in which the shareholders' assembly acknowledged the event of
dissolution.
Events of dissolution consisting of the reduction of the minimum
number of shareholders, partners or members in any business form
governed under the Commercial Code [include the name of the relevant
Code, Decree, Law or Statute] may be cured by conversion into a
simplified stock corporation, provided that unanimous decision is
rendered by the holders of all issued shares or rights, or by the will of the
subsisting shareholder, partner or member.
Section 36. Winding Up.-The simplified stock corporation shall
be wound up in accordance with the rules that govern such proceeding
for stock corporations. The legal representative shall act as liquidator,
unless shareholders appoint any other person to wind up the company.
Chapter VII
Miscellaneous Provisions
Section 37. Financial Statements.-The legal representative shall
submit financial statements and annual accounts to the shareholders'
assembly for approval.
In the event that there is a single shareholder in a simplified stock
corporation, such person shall approve all financial statements and
annual accounts and will record such approvals in minutes within the
corporate books.
Section 38. Shareholder Exclusion.-The by-laws may contain
causes by virtue of which shareholders may be excluded from the
simplified stock corporation. Excluded shareholders shall be entitled to
receive a fair market value for their shares of stock.
Shareholder exclusion shall require majority shareholder approval,
unless a different procedure has been laid down in the by-laws.
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Section 39. Conflict Resolution.-Any conflict of any nature
whatsoever, excluding criminal matters, that arises between shareholders,
managers or the corporation may be subject to arbitration proceedings or
to any other alternative dispute resolution procedure. In the absence of
arbitration, the same disputes will be resolved by (include specialized
judicial or quasi-judicialtribunal).
The decisions rendered by the tribunal are final and shall not be
subject to appeals before any court.
Section 40. Special Provisions.-The legal mechanisms set forth
under Sections 13, 14, 38 and 39 may be included, amended or
suppressed from the by-laws only by unanimous decision rendered by the
holders of all issued and outstanding shares.
Section 41. Piercing the Corporate Veil.-The corporate veil
may be pierced whenever the simplified stock corporation is used for the
purpose of committing fraud. Accordingly, joint and several liability
may be imposed upon shareholders, directors and managers in case of
fraud or any other wrongful act perpetrated in the name of the
corporation.
Section 42. Abuse of Rights.-Shareholders shall exercise their
voting rights in the interest of the simplified stock corporation. Votes
cast with the purpose of inflicting harm or damages upon other
shareholders or the corporation, or with the intent of unduly extracting
private gains for personal benefit or for the benefit of a third party shall
constitute an abuse of rights. Any shareholder who acts abusively may
be held liable for all damages caused, irrespective of the judge's ability
to set aside the decision rendered by the shareholders' assembly. A suit
for damages and nullification may be brought in case of:
(1) Abuse of majority;
(2) Abuse of minority; and
(3) Abusive deadlock caused by one faction under equal division of
shares between two factions.
Section 43. Cross-References.-The simplified stock corporation
shall be governed:
(1) By this Law;
(2) By the formation document, as amended from time to time; or
(3) By statutory provisions contained in the Commercial Code
[include the name of the relevant Code, Decree, Law or Statute]
governing stock corporations.
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Promulgation.-This Act shall be effective as of the date of its
promulgation, and it repeals any and all statutes, acts, codes, decrees, or
provisions of any nature that are inconsistent with this Act.

